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UNDERSTANDING THE ORGANISATIONAL IMPACT OF ERP –
A CASE STUDY IN MANUFACTURING

Carton, Fergal, University College Cork, College Road, Cork, Ireland, f.carton@ucc.ie
Adam, Frédéric, University College Cork, College Road, Cork, Ireland, fadam@afis.ucc.ie

Abstract
An underestimated aspect of the study of ERP implementations is the longer term impact of these
highly integrated applications on the way that managers work. This paper reports on the changes to
managerial decision processes arising from an ERP implementation four years prior to the study.
Using the managers’ own description of their goals as a lens, the objective was to gain an
understanding of the impact of enterprise integration on the capability of the firm. We found that the
ERP system has helped the support functions of the organisation (Finance, Quality and IS) by
standardising transaction processes and thereby increasing their administrative grasp of the firm’s
activities (visibility and control). The benefits for managers responsible for the demand and supply
cycles are, however, scarce. Furthermore, in a dynamic business environment where processes
require constant tweaking to keep abreast of changes in market conditions, highly structuring
technologies such as ERP can rapidly go out of kilter with the reality of doing business, and eventually
hinder the flow of basic performance information. Managers lose out on the efficiency of integration
promised by ERP because of latency in the access to key operational data.
Keywords: ERP impact, decision making, data integrity, organisational goals, latency

1

INTRODUCTION

ERP systems have been implemented by large numbers of firms with the aim of speeding up business
cycle time and reducing the potential for error in information handling in the administration of core
processes in the organisation. By incorporating efficient data capture and storage technology with
powerful networking capacity, the vital transactional information is captured at source by users as an
integral part of their work processes, and then made available instantaneously for other stages in the
process and for management information (Kalakota and Robinson, 2001). This theoretical ideal makes
the concept of ERP an extremely attractive one for large firms faced with on-going struggles to reduce
costs, control large disparate entities and report detailed results to shareholders in a timely fashion
(Holsapple and Sena, 2002).
In practice however, the mixed experience in local sub-units has prompted researchers to question how
to ensure that a local manufacturing plant, for example, can derive benefit from the highly
standardising approach to the management of resources contained in ERP systems (Gattiker &
Goodhue, 2005). Proposing differentiation and interdependence as contextual factors affecting the
eventual benefits derived, the authors show that the overall benefits derived by the plant are
principally centred around data quality and task efficiency. The authors also demonstrate empirically
that the degree of customisation of the application is directly related to the level of local task
efficiency. In other words, organisations derive benefits from ERP implementations in terms of an
increased granularity of information concerning operations, but this granularity has an impact on task
efficiency. Local plants’ ability to derive benefit operational benefits from centralised transaction
processing systems may depend on the fit between the standard processes and local practice. Also, the
highly detailed visibility of the steps in a business process comes at a price. ERP applications, because
of their data hungry nature, expose implementing organisations and their staff to a double observer
effect, whereby not only is the need for users to keep the system up to date disruptive for business
processes, but the very fact that certain activities are clearly visible in the application is behaviouraltering and leads to goal displacement. ERP users experience significant constraints in adjusting the
evolving reality of business activities to “what the system wants”. Consequently the integrity of the
information is increasingly dependent on virtual tools capable of re-interpreting transactional
information from the ERP system into a “version of the truth” that is useful for management decision
making. The development and application of these tools has consequences for the organisation in
terms of resources, but also in terms of reporting latency, as this study revealed.
The potential of highly integrated enterprise systems for decision support must therefore be
investigated in the light of certain factors. Firstly, when selecting and implementing an ERP system,
companies are looking at a good fit with operations, not with the more abstract decision processes.
Companies strive to align their ERP architectures with their operational processes, but the
performance implications of these technical choices are often not considered (Bendoly and Jacobs
2004). Although organisations may have operational policies differing from plant to plant, and these
differences are an accepted element of the corporate landscape, the lines are less clearly drawn around
management decision making in general, and the manner in which managers use performance
information from ERP systems in particular. Managers may rely on many tacit processes for key
decisions and these processes are not necessarily analysed in detail (Lee et al., 2000), nor widely
communicated, as their content may be of strategic importance for the firm, or of tactical importance
to plant managers within the wider corporation. When tacit decision processes are subjected to an
integrating force such as an ERP system, an improvement in performance may not always result.
Secondly, managers are generally concerned with the efficient use of all company resources, including
people, capacity and materials. The data model of ERP applications is inventory centric, and therefore
lacks the scope to be able to support managers in decisions that involve trading off the costs related to
these different resources.

Finally, an ERP implementation implies a certain number of assumptions about the company and how
it operates at a specific point in time (Davenport, 1998). These assumptions may change over time,
due to the organisation changing what it does (Lee and Lee, 2000) or reacting to new opportunities and
threats in the market, leading to radical changes in its business model. The extension of the product
set, or the adoption of new distribution channels are examples of “structural” process changes that
have a clear impact on back office execution activities.
ERP systems require constant maintenance in order to keep pace with these changes. This
maintenance tends to happen by making adjustments at the level of the data because vendors and
consultants profess that the layers of metadata external to the ERP system are easier to change than
disrupting the tightly linked ERP processes. In any case, the skills required to modify an ERP system
at the process level are rare. The daunting complexity of the relational data models at the heart of these
applications, coupled with the depth of business experience required to understand the implications of
process changes for the business, ensure that finding and retaining such resources is an expensive
matter. In a time when business processes were less complex, Dearden (1972) already cast major
doubts (referring to it as “absurd”) on the ability of a group of experts to design a single system for all
aspects of the business for this very reason.
Without the competence and resources to update the application as business processes evolve, the ERP
experience may begin with the promise of increased visibility of operations, but rapidly deteriorate to
a point where management information is more opaque than ever. Inevitably, this visionary initiative
to unite disparate systems becomes itself one more legacy application, and an extremely “high
maintenance” one.
In this paper, we present a case study of a firm in the high tech manufacturing sector which had carried
out a global implementation of a single instance ERP system 4 years previously. The paper begins by
considering the articulation between business processes, the decision making of managers and the
applications that support them. It then presents our research questions and the methodology before
presenting the facts of the case and the conclusions we have derived from them with regard to the
impact of ERP on business processes and the knock-on effects on the decision making of managers.

2

DECISIONS, THE ERP AND THE ORGANISATION

Langley et al. (1995) have identified 3 aspects of decision making which render it a difficult area for
empirical research, and by extension for the highly structured processes of an ERP: (1) Many
decisions do not imply distinct identifiable choices, and are difficult to pin down, in time or in place,
(2) Decision making processes do not necessarily proceed as a linear sequence of steps, rather they are
driven by the emotion, imagination and memories of the decision makers, punctuated by sudden
crystallisations of thought and (3) It is difficult to isolate decision processes, as decisions typically
become intertwined with other decisions. In the context of an ERP implementation, these observations
mean that envisioning the impacts of the ERP on all levels in the decision making processes of the
firm is extremely far-reaching. Post-ERP, organisational actors may face significant changes in their
status and positions as roles and responsibilities have been re-assigned to adapt to the new ERPenabled processes. At a minimum, their contribution may have changed towards less autonomy and
less control. The decision process may have changed insofar as there are new or modified sources of
information and / or different steps to the process. Key decisions may change as the system now
incorporates some of the conditions and exception traps which were previously dealt with manually.
The way most currently implemented ERP applications operate raises the question of whether
management decisions are subject to programming, ie programmable in the sense of Simon’s (1977)
ideas on the structure of decisions. During the implementation of an ERP system, information that was
previously tracked manually (if at all) must now be recorded unambiguously in the system in order for
automatic triggers to be activated allowing transactions to move on to the next stage in the process.
Whether a complete model of the factors involved in any given decision can be proposed is not

considered at this stage, as the focus tends to be turned towards what the application, rather than the
manager, requires. As a result, organisational actors will find out post-implementation if all the
relevant parameters required for their decision making purposes have been taken into account in
setting up the application. If not, they will have to live with reduced flexibility or a workaround until
the ERP is updated. Post go-live, the impetus and resources required to change the application
evaporate rapidly, and the reality is that the workarounds become the rule until the next ERP project.
Gorry (1971) argued that the expansion of information systems into higher management functions has
resulted in an exaggerated focus on information quality, at the expense of an emphasis on decision
making models and their components (constraints, goals and other parameters). In the case of ERP,
this means that implementing an ERP system may complicate decision making for managers. Each
ERP package uses operational models as underlying frameworks and these models can differ in terms
of how they operate. Although managers may have involved in making the configuration decisions
embodied in the business template as implemented by the ERP project team, they will usually be
dissuaded from proposing any changes to these decisions post-implementation. Much of the
requirement for business intelligence tools post-ERP derives from a desire to correct or clarify the
meaning of corporate data that was explicitly hard-wired in the original process template (Carton and
Adam, 2007). In addition, there is a wealth of information important for decision making, which lies
outside the traditional ERP boundaries (Stefanou, 2001) in external sources, and in legacy systems.
Finally, managers require decision making models to help them decipher the complexity of the real
world. ERP systems, while providing solid transactional engines at Anthony’s (1965) operational
control level, tend to increase the volume of information available to managers, but in so doing, add
even greater complexity to decision making at the management control level.
To conclude this argument, the use of such notions as “best practice” and “zero modifications” used
by ERP vendors implies that the collective experience of individual business managers could not be
more apt than the experience of the software vendor. The operational know-how and industry specific
experience of firms can thus be superseded by canned transaction processes. This notion is perhaps
easily sold in the boardroom, but harder to swallow when confronted on a daily basis with the issues
arising from a poor fit between the software and the reality. The tight timescales for the
implementation of ERP systems don’t allow an adequate margin for questioning the corporate
template being rolled out. Managers are thus expected to take on process models that are not their
own, with parameters they had little influence on, and with little access to management reports.
This is likely to bring significant resistance to change post implementation as observed in pre-ERP
times by Little (1970). Such resistance to change will make the impact of ERP applications even more
unpredictable as workarounds emerge that by-pass key stages in the application’s tightly defined
business processes. Because of the automation of the flow of work inherent in these systems, and
because people are compensated on their work rather then their proficiency in using information
systems, users will do what is necessary to keep the transactions running, at the expense of data
quality and integrity. In terms of decision making, this will have significant consequences. Pfeffer
(1992) discusses the selective use of information in management to rationalise decision processes, and
how, under conditions of uncertainty, individuals would prefer to use data and decision making
processes “with which they are comfortable”. Thus, managers may continue to use their own ad-hoc
sources of data and processing routines, if they cannot easily manipulate the data in the ERP.
However, from the broader perspective of the organisation, rather than the individual, integrating
mechanisms are adopted which increase its information processing capabilities (Galbraith, 1974).
ERP systems are integration mechanisms in Galbraith’s parlance, allowing routine and predictable
tasks to be automated. As such, they may take the organisation towards Winter’s (1985) routinised or
high volume mechanistic decision making. Winter (1985) however suggests that there should be a
conscious choice in the selection of which matters to treat mechanistically, and which to treat with
some deliberation. It is debatable whether such selection is up for discussion in an ERP project in that
the choices inherent in implementing and configuring ERP processes amount to suppressing the
choices to be made by process users regarding the day to day routine work. Winter (1985) warns

however, that as the range of situations subsumed by routines expands, and the performance of the
systems improves, there is a corresponding reduction in awareness of the exceptions that may be
useful or even essential to survival. This can lead to “irresponsible or slothful” inattention, whose
consequences are “made to seem tolerable” (p. 111).
Thus, the implementation of ERP, for all its merits in standardization and centralization terms, may
have unpredictable effects on the local decision making abilities of the firm. Existing research is
primarily carried out at the level of firm level benefits, rather than at the level of operational process
level (Cotteleer and Bendoly, 2006). Not only are there many factors involved in the achievement of
these benefits, the range of operational activities touched by these cross functional systems precludes
all but a cursory empirical approach at the transactional level. In an effort to provide definitive leads
for managers involved in implementing ERP, a case study was carried out in a firm with a mature ERP
application to study in detail the impact of these applications on the repetitive decision making
routines in key areas of the manufacturing organisation. In so doing, the authors provide suggestions
for how organisations can equip themselves to support managers in deriving benefit from integrated
enterprise applications.

3

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, QUESTIONS AND METHODS

An information system by definition supports the centralisation of control (Markus & Robey 1988).
Multi-national companies have been implementing integrated enterprise wide systems such as ERP for
more than a decade, with a view to reaping the rewards of the increased visibility of operations that
these applications offer. In this research, an in-depth case study of a successful multinational company
(MNC) was used to explore the role of integrated enterprise applications in supporting managerial
decision making. One of the challenges of research into the impact of integrated applications such as
ERP is to properly identify where this impact should be measured (firm level or process level, for
example), and also where the root cause of “issues” lie. Problems in decision making may be
expressed by managers without reference to ERP systems specifically, and some of the constraints
may arise from legacy applications, or from the complexity of the technical architecture in place,
including the use of multiple data warehouses for management reporting. Managers understandably
show different levels of trust in, and understanding of, these new sources of data.
The aim of this study is to focus on the role played by mature ERP systems in supporting day to day
decision making for managers. By removing the focal point from the ERP project itself, the emphasis
is removed from the implementation choices made by the firm in adapting the ERP solution to their
needs. Improved decision making is rarely a stated objective of these projects, thus the goal of the
research is not to measure implementation success. On the contrary, the goal is to investigate, once the
dust has settled on the ERP implementation, their longer term contribution to management’s ability to
make decisions.
Qualitative data can help researchers understand the dynamics underlying complex relationships, that
is, the “why” of what is happening (Eisenhardt, 1989). The approach adopted in this research was to
triangulate views of key decisions from the different functional managers involved. It was felt that this
qualitative approach represented a non-judgmental, exploratory way for managers, who have
themselves internalized the logic of the “way things are done”, to elucidate their own decision patterns
and biases. For example, extreme pressure on the sales order fulfilment cycle at quarter end is an
observable management headache. However, it is difficult (for all concerned) to identify the causality
relationships between the variables involved, or to delineate definitively between the effects of
transaction volume, administration inefficiency or information system shortcoming.
Single case studies pose an additional challenge of extricating the findings from their specific
organisational context towards generalisable principles. This risk of bias was attenuated by a number
of factors. Firstly, ERP packages are based on a common view of the underlying business model. The
gaps between this model and the way companies operate may vary from case to case, but the latency

impact on decision making is comparable. Secondly, publicly quoted MNC’s operate under the
scrutiny of the Stock Exchange, and the top-down pressure on keeping inventory and costs low, while
maintaining profit margins and customer satisfaction, is universal. Finally, managers are faced with
the same daily high level challenges in any business, ensuring resources are being used efficiently and
effectively in the execution of these corporate objectives.
The research objective was operationalised into 3 separate research questions which yielded a
complete picture of the “footprint” of ERP in different aspects of the managers’ responsibilities.
Research Question 1 was concerned with discovering the goals pursued by the different functions.
The crucial point was to understand how these goals were operationalised, and what managers were
expected to deliver. Research Question 2 was concerned with a more granular view of the execution
of these goals by analysing what decisions managers made on a day to day basis, and their perceptions
of what the critical issues were. Research Question 3 drew on the output from Question 2 and
explored the footprint of ERP in the decisional domains thus identified. Here we sought to gauge the
value of a mature ERP implementation in the map of managerial decisional activity.
These questions were investigated during an in-depth field study of SIT Ltd (not the company’s real
name), a large multinational manufacturing organisation. From April to August 2005, 50 interviews
were carried out with middle and senior managers in all functional areas that were impacted by ERP,
covering manufacturing operations in Ireland and the US, as well as corporate headquarters in the US
(see Table 1). SIT went live on their ERP system in October 2001, so these interviews reflected the
views of managers using a relatively mature system, which is why this firm was selected.
Interview table
Finance
Manufacturing / Distribution
Sales
IS
Engineering
HR
Total

Table 1.

Cork
5
13
4
4
2
2
30

SIT Ltd
Boston
9
6
3
2

20

Total
14
19
7
6
2
2
50

Breakdown of interviews by functional area.

The interviews were recorded and transcribed, yielding over 250,000 words of material. An extremely
high level of access was gained in this firm, and the experience of these managers can be heard in the
language used regarding goals, decisions and issues. In analysing these observations, the meaning was
retained by returning to what was actually said, rather than the researcher’s interpretation of the same.
An example will illustrate the point, where a Cork based purchasing manager is talking about the point
of departure between data driven decisions and real life:
… you have vendors that don’t have anything in capacity, so therefore, at a point in time,
which comes before you actually get a sales order, you are going to have to make an
intellectual decision, to say, yes, go and build it, yes, go and position it.

In this example, the slightly unusual use of the term “intellectual” implies intuitive, gut-feeling
decision making, the subject of Research Question 3, but might easily have been overlooked if not
captured verbatim. Many such examples of embedded meaning justified the transcription effort.
On the other hand, a robust and unique coding methodology was applied to reduce the data and avoid
data analysis paralysis (Yin, 1989). Observations from the transcripts were extracted to a matrix
structured by research question, yielding a total of 1,845 observations. Cell entries were either direct
quotes from transcripts or more often a summary of the issue raised. Using hyperlink functionality
each extracted observation was linked dynamically back to the original transcript, thereby retaining
richness and avoiding “too thin cell entries” (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

These observations were coded at three levels, identifying the interviewee, the business process
commented, and the theme. The business process was recorded independently of the functional
affiliation of the interviewee. For example, observations regarding shipment decisions were classified
as pertaining to the “Deliver” process, and were commented upon by managers from Finance,
Materials, Manufacturing, Distribution, and Sales. The themes began as a set of 13 seed categories,
developed from the literature review, and complemented by themes which emerged from the data.
The next section outlines the background to SIT as a company and the context of the ERP
implementation.

4

CASE STUDY BACKGROUND

The market leader in data management solutions, SIT sees itself as specialising in helping customers
to derive more value from their corporate data. The company is following an aggressive growth, with
17% growth in consolidated revenue in 2005, which was the year in which the case study was carried
out. Revenues have since then continued their upward growth trend, topping $11.2 billion in 2006. SIT
Ltd employs over 26,500 people in 52 operations worldwide. Manufacturing is concentrated in three
sites, one of which is Cork.
From mainframe storage systems in the late 80’s to platform independent network products by the mid
90’s, SIT has evolved into a “solutions” company, delivering not just hardware, but also information
“lifecycle” tools and consulting services. A key complexity of this trend towards full service offerings
is the management of the information flows related to executing a single customer order, which
increasingly is constituted of hardware, software and services. Many of these revenue lines are
executed by multiple locations, over different time horizons, yet the customer will require a single
sales order, single invoice and single goods shipment.
SIT implemented a single instance global ERP system in 2001. This big bang implementation
addressed user requirements for transaction processing in all back office activities relating to sales
order processing, manufacturing, materials planning, distribution and finance. The Oracle based
system supports 4,500 users in 52 countries worldwide, 3 of which involve manufacturing operations.
Sales demand is focused through the ERP based quotation and sales order processing system.
Although a “build to plan” operation, SIT suffers from the hockey stick effect on sales, whereby the
majority (>80%) of orders only become firm in the final 2/3 weeks of the quarter, which places
enormous pressures on managers, operators and systems. One of the key issues of this case is whether
the ERP application helps managers to cope with this pressure or aggravates it.
The next section presents the case study according to the three research questions outlined above.

5

FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDY

5.1

Research Question 1: Organisational goals

SIT is characterised by a “stretch goal” culture, whereby top management communicates high level
goals in terms of revenues and product mix at quarterly shareholder briefings. This communication
draws a line in the sand both for the sales organisation and the three manufacturing operations and
their respective supply chains. Goals and budgets are disseminated downwards through each
functional organisation and geography. Manufacturing are driven by product availability plans, sales
are driven by revenue targets, and Finance are driven by external shareholder expectations of revenue
and profitability.
The goals are subject to frequent change, depending upon the messages that company officers wish to
transmit to the stock market regarding SIT’s performance, or according to unpredicted trends in

demand. At an operational level, these changes directly influence managerial decisions (concerning
the disposition of resources) and operational decisions (which products to ship). Changes to goals
seem to permeate right down to the execution level, where distribution and customer operations are
making decisions on what backlog orders to ship based on sales targets. These targets are viewed
simultaneously by revenue, margin, product and geographic region.
A key issue in achieving corporate goals is that revenue targets use average prices which don’t capture
either the complexity of the products or the seasonality of sales activities. SIT’s data storage solutions
are required to fit the customer’s specific technical infrastructure, thus the products are highly
configurable, and consequently the sales procedure for higher end solutions can be long. Furthermore,
with hockey stick pressure on sales reps to close their deals in the current quarter, the actual price on
any given customer order can vary considerably as the bargaining power of customers increases.
The pressure on distribution and managers increases with the seasonality of the business. Requiring
simultaneous access to information on units shipped and consequent revenue attainment, managers at
the plant find themselves running “blind”, that is transacting shipments to execute on customer orders
but missing the visibility of these shipments from a reporting perspective due to systems latency.
Thus, the SIT case illustrates the trend in multinationals towards a culture based on a “load and chase”
philosophy. High level goals are set at the beginning of the period and communicated broadly, being
thereafter treated as set in stone. Variations in demand, on the other hand, cause uneven patterns of
operational activity and place huge strain on the execution organisation. Reacting to actual versus plan
updates becomes an onerous part of execution activity, as distinct from simply dealing with execution
issues. Exactly how this decentralisation of responsibility impacts the decision making of managers is
explored in the next section.
5.2

Research Question 2: Management decisions

The key management decisions at the SIT manufacturing plants and at headquarters level are
concerned with how to orchestrate the increasingly multi-source supply chain to meet customer
demand effectively, whilst keeping costs at a minimum. For the execution side of the business, this
means guaranteeing the availability of raw materials to production, ensuring procurement stays in line
with the build plan and actual demand, dealing with production contingencies that affect capacity or
yield, and prioritising customer orders for shipment, all this with minimal stock levels. Four principal
questions summarise these decisions, what to plan, what to buy, what to produce and what to deliver.
5.2.1

What to Plan and what to Buy

The basic planning decisions concern what quantities of raw materials to purchase and what
production schedule to follow in order to meet the material availability goal specified in the build plan.
These decisions entail a high degree of visibility of current sources of inventory, in all its forms, and
planned product build levels, in sufficient details to be able to break out component requirements.
Alternate sources of supply are managed through the Bill of Materials, and buyers must be prepared to
take into account component level revisions and quality issues arising from the test process. As SIT’s
high end products have long lead times, planners, and consequently buyers, are working in a “build to
plan” mode where key purchasing decisions must be made in the absence of actual demand data. For
mid- and lower-range products the lead time is shorter, but the volumes are greater.
Product goes out to, and comes back from, a variety of sources, including vendors for normal receipts
and re-worked material, customers with material on loan or evaluation, and internal customers such as
engineering and customer service. Planners need visibility of all these potential sources of demand and
supply, and a custom solution was built to accommodate the functionality that an ERP system could
not handle. Even with this custom built tool, much of the decision making is off-line, as one materials
manager in Cork commented:

Well, you know, you’re always going to have to be intuitive anyway. But what you are doing is
you’re making your intuitive decision in your brain, but you’re inputting it into the tool

Once materials have been made available to production, Assembly & Test kicks off and the decisions
for managers become more focused on capacity, yield and achieving the build plan.
5.2.2

What to make

The manufacturing mindset at SIT is focused on “not being the obstacle” to the company achieving its
revenue target because of product availability. The build plan for high end products is executed
“blind” in terms of what product configurations will actually be specified by customers on sales
orders. Management decisions revolve mostly around the impact of quality issues or build plan
changes on capacity (equipment, space or labour) because all products are manufactured “fully
loaded” and then de-configured to fit customer orders as needed.
Purges due to quality issues and product revisions are daily occurrences for manufacturing managers.
For example, there can be as many as 40 “up-revs” a week (suppliers deliver upgraded versions of
their components). In these cases Engineering will require an immediate snapshot of all affected
inventory. Decisions on what, when and how to purge are evaluated in terms of impact to the build
plan, but also in terms of individual customer commitments.
The effect of dealing with the various contingencies in manufacturing is often to push the problems to
the back end of the quarter, as one manager described it:
I think the reality is, as the problems arise, inevitably all the people will tend to back-end it on
the quarter, and we will have more to do later in the quarter than previously considered.

Once goods have made it through manufacturing to the finished goods area, they are now in a position
to be allocated to sales orders, which is the responsibility of the Distribution organisation.
5.2.3

What to deliver

Distribution is focused on achieving the revenue target and clearing the backlog of approved orders.
Although sales are satisfied once revenue targets are achieved, unfulfilled orders in backlog are seen
as revenue “left on the shelf”. This means delivering customers everything ordered within the commit
dates, no matter how late orders are received. This implies a radical shrinking of process cycle time at
quarter end, with orders turned around in a fraction of the time it normally takes. There is even a “Day
32” customisation to the ERP system which allows orders to be physically shipped in time for quarter
end, but allowing the related keying of the transactions on ERP to happen the next day.
SIT have an essentially manual sales order allocation process for higher value sales. Instead of sales
orders being assigned to finished goods, it is the other way around, whereby managers run through a
list of finished goods, allocating them to sales orders. Once the “best match” has been found for a
product and corresponding sales order, and sales operations are satisfied that this deal represents the
optimal use of that inventory (in terms of revenue and margin), then technicians manually deconfigure the product in question to the sales order, and the order can move on to shipment.
The task of managing shipments in this way has become much more complex due to the range of
products sold. The price book now contains 1400 products. Fulfilment of an order might conceivably
involve physical product coming from many different places, including some third party product. This
is a mindset change for distribution, who are used to physically handling everything that goes out the
door, and also a process challenge, as the ERP based shipping process is based on a presumption that
an order is entirely shipped from one location.
Meanwhile sales operations, a sales support group working alongside their colleagues in Distribution,
but reporting to the Finance organization, are concentrated on trying to get the “highest dollars out”.
This implies not simply reducing backlog, but reducing it in an order of priority which optimizes the

chances of hitting revenue targets for the different lines of the business and reduces the risk of the
corporation being penalised on the stock market.
5.3

Research Question 3: ERP value in managerial decision making

ERP has had a huge positive impact, particularly in the corporate finance area, where month end close
has been reduced to a matter of days. The immediate integration of the expenditure activities of newly
acquired companies is only possible because of the global Chart of Accounts and standardised
purchase requisition processes offered by the ERP system.
Nevertheless, at a local manufacturing level, it is highly debatable whether the ERP investment can be
considered beneficial. The latency in transaction processing time (up to several hours at quarter end),
the failure to use MRP (because it does not understand the full complexity of SIT’s Bills of Materials),
the inability of ERP to give a true and accurate picture of all inventory (because of units that are being
reworked or on loan to potential customers), have diluted the contribution of ERP in manufacturing.
Managers were asked about the value of ERP across the different processes investigated at SIT. Table
2, where “-“ denotes negative opinions, “+” denotes positive opinions and “=” denotes neutral
opinions gives a summary of the quantitative analysis of the interview transcripts. The table shows the
dominance of negative opinions on the impact of ERP (68.5%) and the polarisation around negative or
positive opinions (less than 2.8% of references to the value of ERP in terms of the key business
processes were neutral). The largest proportion of negative opinions were concerned with the value of
ERP to the “deliver” process (89%), which comes as no surprise given the still largely manual process.
ERP impact by Business Process
Plan
Buy
Make
Deliver
Quote to cash
Report
Approve & Pay
Forecast
Total

Table 2.

13
20
50
103
71
87
20
8
372

+
6
10
28
13
26
63
8
2
156

=
1
5
7
2

15

Total
20
30
83
123
97
152
28
10
543

Footprint of ERP by process at SIT

Thus, ERP is a poor fit to SIT’s most transaction intensive business processes, notably production
planning, MRP, procurement and sales order execution. Furthermore, management information at SIT
transits via a number of custom-built data warehouses, each of which has different refresh rates from
the ERP production data (varying from every 10 minutes, to every 8 hours, to every 24 hours). Thus,
despite the existence of a centralized repository for all transactional data, SIT managers are in a
quandary regarding reporting, as one corporate controller described it:
We need to have one source of information, you can’t use your version of the truth, and my
version of the truth, we spend all our time reconciling to each other’s reports

This complex and centralised technical architecture means that in practice, if managers are not
physically close to the ERP support organisation (at corporate headquarters in Boston), the chances of
obtaining the reports they require for decision support are slim. At the time of the case study, three
years after go-live, some Cork managers had system modification requests still pending development.
Even corporate finance found it difficult to retain the skills necessary to exploit he richness of
information held in the ERP system. These highly skilled resources are tied up in the sort of low-value
and repetitive data reconciliation work that the ERP system was destined to eradicate. In SIT, as in
many organisations, the information required by managers to make decisions is contained in a number
of systems, including the enterprise systems such as ERP, associated data warehouses and manual

tools such as spreadsheets. The more systems involved, the greater the information latency. Equally,
the multiplication of systems introduces data integrity issues.
The ERP system has allowed the firm to face up to accelerated flows of transactions and supported the
constant growth of the business over a 4 year period. However, at the time of the case study, the
systems were again beginning to grind to a halt at quarter end.
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The data integrity brought about by the ERP system at the time of implementation has removed some
of the dead time involved in arguing about data integrity, and in-so-doing it gave managers more time
to focus on more value-adding activities. A Senior VP for Finance described the benefit and its
reliance on people thus:
Finance is able to spend more of its time in analysis and less arguing about the validity of the
data. Analysis is extremely powerful and investigative, we need smart people (…) to drive it.

On the other hand, plant level managers are limited in their ability to exploit ERP to investigate the
causes of variances in operational performance. This study highlights a number of barriers to site level
managers exploiting the richness of information held within the ERP system:
• Lack of local skills (detailed knowledge of the business processes and of the ERP configuration)
• Consequent inability to reconstitute meaning from the transactional data extracted from the ERP
structure, or to integrate it with data from other sources
• Lack of access to data (access to production data is more or less proscribed)
• Process latency resulting from the poor fit of the ERP with the specificities of certain business
processes (the application doesn’t capture the necessary detail, or too much detail)
• Latency in providing the required data because of the technical infrastructure
Plant level users are left on their own to master the information held in the ERP, and yet very few have
the requisite level of access (or skills) to explore the possibilities of using the data to support
management questions. Standard reports are often ignored, by both users and IT, and there is a
commonly held belief that “if it’s not in a spreadsheet then it’s not acceptable”, which is paradoxical
in an ERP-enabled business. To conclude, there is a multi-faceted gap between the information
required to put together managerial metrics and the information and functionality available
automatically in ERPs.
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FURTHER RESEARCH

This research validates the approach of using business processes, and the detailed steps within those
processes, as the unit of analysis in measuring the impact of these hugely integrated applications. The
organisation is extremely diverse, and ERP systems touch so many different functional areas, that it is
impossible to decipher their impact without descending into the detail of what people actually do.
A limitation in this research has been the abstraction from the detailed implementation issues faced by
the organisation in implementing their ERP system. Specifically, during implementation, choices were
made in the configuration, customisation and integration of the standard ERP software to work with
legacy applications and processes for this organisation. Manager’s opinions of the role of ERP will
therefore inevitably be coloured by factors that are outside the scope of the ERP system itself, and
linked to the context in which the system was implemented. In this study we did not seek to
differentiate between the contextual elements and the system itself. Instead we focused on the
perceptions of managers, where these two dimensions are inextricably merged. In extending this
research, it is not certain how a methodology could be adapted which would take into account the
decisions made at implementation time.

Further research should be oriented towards frameworks for modelling and actively managing the gap
between business processes and the enterprise system, such that adequate resources can be deployed to
address the gap before the benefits of a centralised IT infrastructure are frittered away in a blossoming
of local data warehouse solutions and personal spreadsheets. This research should address the means
the organization needs to put in place to plan for the eventual divergence of ERP systems from reality,
and to mitigate against this gap with skills and tools. A non trivial starting point would be to design a
framework for the tools, skills and resources capable of reporting on the gap, such that the gradual
tendency towards system obsolescence is visible, and can be rectified on the fly.
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